Charlie Wilson's Role in the Afghan War

By: Thomas Luley

Charlie Wilson’s role in the Afghan War is undeniable and indispensable to the effort put forth by those who fought the Soviet invasion. He shows the capability a motivated and talented member has in creating and implementing a policy in the United States Congress. He shows two major strengths throughout his crusade, which made all the difference between him being successful and unsuccessful. These two strengths were simply put his ability to listen and his ability to get other people to listen to him.

As a member of Congress he had a responsibility to listen to the concerns of his constituents and bring those concerns to Congress if they were of merit. When constituents, most notably Joanne Herring, came to him with concerns Charlie listened and in the particular case of Joanne Herring and the Afghan War he brought that to Congress. One of Charlie Wilson’s greatest assets was his ability to work with people to get what he wanted and that ability was deeply rooted in one of Congress’ greatest strengths as described by Hamilton. Hamilton talks about how Congress should be an accessible and ideally a representative body with respect to its constituencies. Joanne Herring, a constituent, lobbied her member of Congress to get something done and the member, Charlie Wilson, was responsive and took the constituent’s concern to heart. Charlie was both accessible and responsive to his constituency.

One of the strengths of Congress that Hamilton identifies is its oversight capability. In the case of Charlie Wilson’s involvement in the Afghan War we see both a great success and a great failure. Charlie Wilson and other members of Congress who he worked with used their oversight of the CIA and their covert operations to identify an area where the CIA was not living up to what was expected of them and not accomplishing everything they were capable of. The greatest accomplishment may not be the simple recognition of this but it may come in the fact that Wilson and other members took a constructive approach rather than a destructive one. They realized that the failure of the plan was not in the basis and theory behind it rather it was in the way the operation was being funded and carried out and they then worked to correct these problems through their roles as Congressmen. This is a huge strength of Wilson because it showed he differed from the Congressional norm by not only destructively criticizing but also offering a substantive and pragmatic alternative.

Hamilton also harps on the fact that Congress is all too often unable to act decisively on matters of vital importance in foreign policy. Once again Charlie Wilson is a shining example of a divergence from this axiom. Using his gathered influence and favor in Congress, Wilson was able to take an issue that was consigned to the position of garnering little attention in Congress to getting Congress to fund and support the largest and most successful covert operation in American history. Charlie Wilson used what he had at his disposal to get Congress to act decisively on a somewhat contentious issue when it had been reluctant to do so in this and other similar situations. This should be seen as a major accomplishment as it is difficult for a group of people to effect change in such a large, cumbersome, deeply entrenched organization like the United States Congress and this major change was affected by one man, and a few supporters.

Charlie Wilson’s involvement with the Afghan War was not without failures and deficiencies. There were areas where Charlie was doing what he thought was best to accomplish his goals almost in opposition to his responsibilities as a member of Congress. Wilson many times would do what he thought would best further his causes rather than play by the rules and many times fully think through the repercussions of the actions he was taking.

While being responsive and accessible to one’s constituency is necessary and proper, Congress has a habit, as described by Hamilton, of often being too easily influence by special interests. Charlie Wilson’s involvement in Afghanistan is a perfect example of this. While he should definitely be listening to his constituents, like Joanne Herring, he should not have allowed so much of his personal policy to be dictated by such one person or one interest group. This is an area where a delicate balance is necessary to be successful. Listening to constituents and differing points of view are important ways to help formulate policy but should not be allowed to take over that policy formation.

One area where I feel Congress as a whole really disregarded some of their Constitutionally appointed duties and powers is in the arena of oversight. While Wilson and some of his colleagues rightly identified deficiencies in the CIA’s handling of the situation, few, if any, ever really attempted to take oversight responsibility over the massive spending being undertaken by Wilson. The simple fact one Congressman was able to appropriate that large of a sum of money without the normal Congressional oversight is a major deficiency on Congress’ part. Part of this can be attributed to Wilson’s fortunate placement on several very influential committees and subcommittees at the same, opportune time. Yet this cannot serve as an excuse for the lack of oversight. It should have been cause for greater concern amongst his Congressional colleagues, that the possibility Wilson could wield this much power, influence, and money, with little if any challenge from anyone.

The last and most challenging point to defend is about the dangerous precedent that Charlie Wilson’s actions set. While his unbridled enthusiasm and fervor for solving this situation were admirable the reckless abandon with which he pursued his means to an end was irresponsible. With an unproven plan whose results could not be guaranteed or even predicted to a reasonable certainty, it was somewhat unwise to spend in the way Charlie Wilson did. Yes, in the end, his actions were successful but what if instead his actions ended up causing a catastrophic event in US foreign policy? The actions undertaken by Charlie Wilson and his colleagues were excessively risky and because of their success have set a dangerous precedent that such risk is an acceptable practice to be undertaken by members of the United States Congress. Along the lines of irresponsible risks Charlie Wilson took, more so than even the reckless spending was the fact we were supplying weapons to a group fighting the Soviet Union. This action alone could have sparked World War Three as we were still in the midst of the Cold War during the operation. Once again Charlie Wilson almost unilaterally decided that risking armed conflict with the Soviet Union was worth arming the Afghanis in their fight against the Soviet invaders, invariably putting the entire nation in danger.

Overall Charlie Wilson’s involvement in the Afghan War would have to be considered a success. While his actions were fraught with incredible risk, it can be said that all great accomplishments come with some form of great risk. I believe that the most important factor in his success was his willingness to take that risk and go for the big success. While common sense would say that the risk outweighed the reward Charlie Wilson believed in his convictions and pushed forward and in the end because of his persistence achieved the greatest success in covert operations history. His effectiveness is undoubtedly due to this dogged persistence and determination to do what he believed necessary regardless of the risk.

Wilson’s role is definitely not what is explicitly outlined in the Constitution but is exactly what this situation called for. The Constitution never intended for one man to be policy advocate, money disperser, and oversight all at the same time but that is what Charlie Wilson was. While the Constitution provides the necessary framework to ensure a deliberative process through which decisions can be made, that framework many times is too slow and too indecisive for challenges brought before it. Wilson definitely took some liberty with what his constitutionally afforded rights and powers were, but did so only because he believed it was necessary to obtain a sufficient and timely solution. While the Constitution should be seen as a framework for how our government operates, it should not be too strictly interpreted so as to constrict some necessary flexibility.

I would strongly discourage any member from taking Charlie Wilson’s approach to foreign policy creation because as I have stated before while it worked once, it may not work again and without certain assurances the risk just simply is not worth it. The recommendations made by Hamilton are much closer to what I would prefer to see happen. Hamilton’s idea of clearing a lot of the bureaucracy and confusion around who has jurisdiction is an absolute necessity in my opinion. As the saying goes “Too many cooks in the kitchen spoils the sauce” so is true of issues in Congress and most certainly foreign policy. When the US needs to be putting forward one unified front towards to the rest of the world we cannot have different groups of our government claiming responsibility and legitimacy in the area. Hamilton goes further and talks about the need to clear special interests from the foreign policy creation equation. This again is absolutely necessary in my opinion. Once again the Afghan War and Charlie Wilson are the exception not the rule where special interests and the interests of the government happened to line up. Too much special interest influence could lead to the government taking stances and enacting policy that may not be the best course of action for the country as a whole but rather only beneficial to those interest groups who have been able to successfully lobby the government.

Read more...

The Thin Veil of American Altruism

by: Alison Salisbury

American foreign policy in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can be defined by the unique collaboration of cultural, economic, and political policies that has been a factor in every subsequent era of foreign policy in the United States. American policies toward China and Latin America from 1890 to 1920 imposed a protectionist doctrine against European encroachment on these regions, justified by the U.S as altruistic in nature. However, American protectionism of China and Latin America ultimately served as an alternative means of colonialism in these regions, driven by American desires for economic expansion. Altruism was a thin cover for American economic expansionist policies like the Open Door Policy in China and Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America.

In the decades that followed the Civil War, a new prosperous United States rose from the ashes of what had been a fiercely divided nation. Highly industrialized and with new technology like the telegraph, railroad, and steamship, the U.S. emerged as an important player in the world market. Foreign policy makers and businessmen were highly aware of the potential for American goods abroad. Senator Albert Beveridge expressed these sentiments in 1898, acknowledging: “…today, we are raising more than we can consume, making more than we can use. Therefore we must find new markets for our produce.”3 Americans like Beveridge, while touting the new economic power of the U.S., was also afraid of the potential damage it could do to the country. In order to avoid the danger of over production, foreign markets quickly became the answer to new American economic growth. The rise of American commercial power with desires to expand sparked a global race between Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S. to establish firm holds on economic markets around the world leading up to the dawn of the twentieth century. This desire to establish global markets, combined with the emergence of the American commercial giant encouraged the United States to adopt an expansionist foreign policy in order to develop strong footholds in Latin America and China to sell their goods.

Americans recognized their potential to establish foreign markets dominated by U.S. made goods. While the United States realized the promising capital gains from expanding markets, some Americans argued that expanding U.S. markets abroad was not an option but rather a necessity in order to continue to achieve economic prosperity in the United States. One such individual was Charles Denby, Jr. who wrote that, “The productiveness of American industry has outstripped the demand of the American market, and the manufacturer begins to look abroad… For the manufacturer of the United States the export trade has become a necessity, and it should be fostered with a jealous care.” Denby was quick to note that American businesses can go abroad and gain markets, but it is only with the support of the United States government to aid these ventures in the political realm that American economic prosperity can continue to boom. It is with arguments like Denby’s in mind that over the course of the 1890s to the 1920s U.S. foreign policy used plans like the Open Door Policy and Dollar Diplomacy to secure the markets that Denby emphasized needed to be so guarded closely for American interests. In order to achieve such results, the United States adopted a foreign policy portrayed to be altruistic, but in reality was only meant to further American interests.

The Open Door Policy in China is a specific example of the economic expansionist policies explored by the United States between 1890 and 1920. The late nineteenth century was ripe with conflicts all over the world, including Asia. Viewed as the next frontier by Europeans and Americans alike, the Asian continent quickly became the newest colonial playground. European powers, aided by internal strife in China, quickly established spheres of influence in the country. Americans quickly discovered the wealth of Chinese markets. Although the United States still lacked the military power that European nations used to create markets in China, the U.S. instituted a policy based on the Open Door Notes of 1899 that guaranteed the right to hold markets in China. Richard F. Hinton explains the need for the U.S. to differentiate themselves from Europeans in the matter of foreign markets, explaining: “… it will be to our best interest to give counsel and lend protection, perhaps, to others of the peoples who dwell on the Indian Archipelago, Cochin-China, Siam, etc. We must aid them to stand alone, because we shall in that way only secure our share of the rich commerce there.” Hinton argues that it is not just about gaining new markets around the world. Rather, it is the rapport the U.S. would gain as a defender of Chinese interests in the face of European domination that would allow the United States to gain more market advantages in China. Hinton’s concept of U.S. protection for China directly feeds into the premise of altruism acting as a thin guise for American economic expansion, which was achieved through the Open Door Policy.

The Open Door Notes of 1899 was a bold move by the United States government to stop the sectioning off of China by European powers. In order to avoid such arrangements, Americans argued for an “equality of access” in China, rather than a sphere of influence. Not strong enough militarily to substantially influence European power in China, the U.S. led through their commercial power by suggesting shipping and railway privileges be equal for all world powers in China. By claiming in the Notes to respect Chinese sovereignty, and suggest a general Chinese tariff collected by the Chinese government, the United States offered an arrangement that appeared to be altruistic in nature, but this policy simply aided the United States in gaining an economic foothold in China with little respect for the Chinese people.

Americans sought to influence the Chinese in a social and cultural sense through the Open Door Notes. Even while calling to respect the sovereignty of China, American missionaries flooded the country, establishing schools and Christian establishments in hopes of westernizing China and making its officials grateful to Americans. These endeavors hardly had their intended effect, as the Chinese resented the cultural and social intrusions into their country through responses like the Boxer Rebellion. While the Chinese desired their nation to become an international economic market, they did not want it to come at the expense of their traditions and culture. In this manner, the supposed altruism of the U.S. failed, and it drove the Chinese to view Americans in a similar light to that of their European counterparts. The failed mirage of American altruism left the U.S. portrayed as just another world power set on achieving an economic and ideological marketplace strictly for their benefit. The United States also tried to pursue a policy of altruism in Latin America with dollar diplomacy. Implemented by President William Howard Taft, dollar diplomacy became Taft’s central foreign policy emphasizing the use of money and commerce to lead the United States abroad, instead of a policy based on military power as favored by his predecessor Theodore Roosevelt. Based on his experience as Governor of the Philippines, Taft wanted to achieve a foreign policy that implemented humanitarian and development ideas into U.S. policy to encourage Latin American countries to look favorably at the U.S. This enhanced the thin cover of altruism in American foreign policy.

Dollar diplomacy was touted to be mutually beneficial to the U.S. and the countries that received U.S. loans. In the case of Nicaragua, the supposed altruism of the United States with dollar diplomacy ended up working against the United States. U.S companies had been involved in Nicaraguan affairs for many years by the time of the Taft presidency. The rise of dictator Jose Santos Zelaya threatened these interests as he created an export tax, which greatly affected the U.S. banana companies in Nicaragua. The fear that Zelaya would limit capitalist ventures encouraged the U.S. to support a revolution in favor of Adolfo Diaz. Deeply in debt under Diaz, Taft suggested a U.S. loan to help deal with the debt and keep Diaz in power. While championed as an altruistic gesture of the U.S. to Nicaragua, Taft was more concerned about protecting U.S. economic ventures in the country through monetary loans and supporting an uprising against a leader who did not look favorably on the U.S. than truly hoping to benefit Nicaragua. By giving a loan to Nicaragua, the United States was strengthening their foothold in the country by ensuring Nicaragua would have to repay the United States back for the loan. By engaging Nicaragua to pursue such a loan, the U.S. was guaranteed Nicaraguan policies that would look more favorably on American interests in the country until these loans were paid off.

In Nicaragua, dollar diplomacy did not end up having the effect Taft intended. The loan given to Nicaragua paired with a corrupt Diaz government led to a surge in nationalism. Subsequently debt continued to rise, Diaz was overthrown, and U.S. resentment increased dramatically. Adding to U.S. resentment, Taft had to send in Marines to quell the revolt. What was a policy that intended to encourage peace in Latin America and garner support for American economic and political ventures ultimately ended up having the opposite effect. Although touted as altruistic in nature, dollar diplomacy in Nicaragua proved to solidly be a U.S. economic venture that threw a country into revolution and farther in debt than it had been before. The 1890s to the 1920s was a period of rapid economic growth for the United States. In this sense, economic prosperity encouraged the evolution of American foreign policy to look outward for new markets to expand. While trying to maintain traditional foreign policy themes likes avoiding political alliances and protecting U.S. interests in the Western hemisphere, Americans developed a policy that appeared to be altruistic in nature. However, by examining the Open Door Policy and Dollar Diplomacy, the altruism championed by the United States appears to have been a thin veil, screening a more American-centric motive for economic expansion while disregarding the effects on the countries these markets were established in, culminating in a unique form of colonialism.

Read more...

The Changing Norm of Humanitarian Intervention

by Kelsey King

The norm of humanitarian intervention at present is multilateral, intervention in nations without geostrategic or economic importance; however, the changing concept of humanity, specifically from the 19th century through present day, has shaped the norms of intervention.[1] While the concept of humanitarian intervention has existed for well over a hundred years, humanitarian intervention, as practiced in contemporary society, is a construct of the post-Cold War civil society.

Starting with the Greek War for Independence and ending with the Bulgarian agitation, the norm of intervention in the 19th century defined intervention as necessary when Muslims killed Christians; however, Christian slaughter of Muslims constituted victory rather than a tragedy. [2] Intervention in the 19th century is interesting as the commonalities of intervention on behalf of Christians against the Ottoman Turks show a very clear definition of who was human by Western European standards. European interveners were willing to overlook atrocities committed by Christians against the Turks, however atrocities committed against Christians (either in response to attack or unprovoked) were cause to disregard Ottoman sovereignty and enact humanitarian interventions. [3] This is not to say that the interventions of the 19th century lacked geostrategic importance, however, the geostrategic importance of intervention was not the deciding factor in these humanitarian intervention.

This common norm of intervention on the side of Christianity faltered late in the 19th century as a norm of non-intervention began to emerge. During the majority of the 19th century, religious ties were the common factor in humanitarian intervention; however, with non-intervention in the case of Armenia- no Christian western European nations gave aid or intervened against the Ottoman Turks- the norm of intervention begins to change.[4]

Throughout the majority of the 20th century, humanitarian nonintervention remained the norm, especially during the Cold War. By definition, no humanitarian intervention took place during the Cold War; rather there were political interventions and unilateral actions. Multilateralism in humanitarian intervention is a lasting norm of intervention that grew out of the interventions of the 19th century and has continued today in the post-Soviet era.[5] While humanitarian crises motivated a number of the unilateral actions of the Cold War, the lack of multilateralism in terms of intervention prevented the classification of these conflicts humanitarian interventions.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the norms regarding sovereignty shifted once again as humanitarian intervention returned as a major concern in the international community. The concept of humanity shifted beyond the narrow definition that included only Europeans, Christians, or European-Christians, rather the definition of humanity now included people of all races and religions from all around the world. The expansion of the definition of humanity directly influenced the type of humanitarian interventions that emerged in the late 20th century. Scholars have attributed the shift in the definition of the "human" and "humanity" to the social consciousness movements of the 19th and 20th century. Specifically, the changing definition of humanity was born out of the anti-slavery and the decolonization movements of the 19th and the 20th centuries. The anti-slavery moment showed the emergence of the expansion of the definition of humanity. The expanded definition of humanity legitimized the concerns of people who were previously invisible to the West.

Read more...

Terrorism and Democracy

by Timothy Little

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but it is the way we address it is. As the U.S. moves forward in combating this threat, a more aggressive foreign policy is needed. Diplomacy alone is not enough to counter this, military force must be utilized. Terrorism is never justifiable and therefore the response of democracies must change. Although the Bush administration has already taken aggressive approach to combat terrorism more of an international effort is required.

The Justification of Terrorist Acts

Terrorist acts are never justifiable.The only means states can communicate this to terrorists is by never capitulating to terrorist demands. World War II taught everyone that appeasement only makes the aggressor more aggressive; the same applies to terrorism. Terrorists that successfully cause a state to change their policy will only become further emboldened. If the United States complied with the demands of al-Qaeda after the events of September 11th, then the U.S. would have faced greater terrorist threats at-home. This doctrine faced a major setback in 2004 with the aftermath of the Madrid bombing. After the attack on the Madrid train system by Islamic extremists, Spain withdrew troops from operations inside Iraq, thus surrendering to terrorist demands. Although Spain has not suffered from acts of terrorism since, their capitulation sent a message to terrorists that unjustifiable actions could yield positive results.

Justifiable implies a moral vindication of an action. Terrorism, by nature, is never justifiable despite any gains it may produce favorable to the terrorists. When states surrender to terrorism, they send a false claim to terrorists that their actions are justifiable. It is human nature that when an action produces a favorable result that the action continues. Therefore, states must stand unified in rejecting terrorist demands. One state cowering to terrorists creates a global setback in the war against terrorism.

The Right of All Democracies

Democratic governments have the right to defend themselves by any means necessary to ensure their continual survival. Since states should never negotiate with terrorists, the inevitable result between states and terrorists is armed conflict.

Military force is a widely accepted means to accomplish the goals of the state. What makes a democracy different in its conduct of war then other states is its propensity for being the least likely form of government to go to war. The means to defend one’s self by any means necessary implies that overwhelming use of force is permissible. However, it should be a last resort. Military force is a vital means for democracies to defend against terrorists. In fighting a war, it is necessary that democracies avoid sacrificing anything of moral value; actions in concert with force ought to follow the principles of just war theory.

Democracies must not only utilize military force, but a moral one as well. It is common understanding that diplomacy, like war, is a tool of statecraft. States have carried out wars and other forms of military interventions since their creation. However, moral credibility is also a vital tool in combating terrorism. Democracies need to win the hearts and minds of people who support terrorists. For this reason, the actions of democracies in conducting military operations require a moral scope. Democracies need to defeat terrorism on the ground while ensuring that it does not reoccur in future generations.

The U.S. and the Global War on Terror

Since the United States declared war on terrorism, the greatest action undertaken by the U.S. has been an offensive course that has brought the war to rogue states supporting terrorism while advancing the spread of democracy. The U.S. could not simply ignore external threats by strengthening its defensive capability in preparation for other attacks. Regime change and nation building is an effective facet of U.S. foreign policy. Actions undertaken in Afghanistan by NATO and Coalition forces in Iraq are examples of an aggressive foreign policy that uses hard power to achieve results.

Initial military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq to oust the ruling regime proved victorious and made the U.S. and other democracies safer from terrorism. However, post-war reconstruction to build stable democracies in those areas has not had such successes and in some instances reversed initial tactical victories.

Democracies are considerably less likely to go to war against one another and more democracies need to exist. However, how to create a democracy is highly debatable. An Islamic democracy within the Middle East would have the greatest affect against terrorism. Actions inside Iraq, despite reasons for invasion in 2003, to build a stable democracy is the most effective action undertaken by the U.S. to combat terrorism.

Despite implementation failings, the policy is a sound one and the U.S. should continue reconstruction in Iraq. It is the duty of all democracies to spread democracy to the world. A free world, sympathetic to American ideology and values is a safer world.

Read more...

Renaissance Venice: The Cradle of Modern Diplomacy

by Jackie burns

The Republic of Venice is known to posterity as a great patron of art, music, and literature. Home to one of the most liberal governments during the Renaissance up to the fall of the Republic in 1797, Venice was viewed as a commercial titan with a culture unique unto itself. Its survival was due in part to both geographic and geo-political power balances and how the Venetians were able to adapt. A metropolis built over the waters of the Adriatic, Venice was forced by its natural environment to use the waters as the main source of economic aggrandizement and consequently political security. By the 14th and 15th centuries, Renaissance Venice was channeling her energies into commerce; the Republic was put into direct contact with powers from all over the world.

It is no wonder then, with such an internationally dependent polity, that the government saw it beneficial to establish permanent fixtures in all important seats of power to speak on behalf of Venice. The volume of business transactions consistently transpiring between Venetian merchants and other states, let alone its geo-political position as a main Italian city-state and holder of lands far beyond the lagoon, made it essential that the Venetian government know what was both the political and economic climate from Constantinople to London. The creation of a permanent diplomatic corps abroad is directly related to the geopolitical reality of the day in Venice, as well as the necessity of accurate information on economic issues that made a mercantile state like the Republic successful. It thus must be seen as the precursor for all modern diplomatic organizations of the present era.

The idea of an ambassador is not a concept that Venice invented, as much as a Venetian might protest to the contrary. Rulers often sent official delegations to other important heads of power to communicate political intentions, to create alliances, gather intelligence, or discuss war between two political entities. The use of “envoys and emissaries to convey messages from one ruler to another probably goes back to the beginning of history…in the second letter to the Church of Corinth, the Apostle Paul describes himself as an ambassador.” However, the official international recognition of ambassadors was not codified until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. So where does that leave Venice in the history of diplomatic machinations? In all, Venice refined and systematized the notion of an ambassador to an extent that made it an enviable model for the powers it had relations with. Eventually the example would be replicated in many, if not all other states.

The true birth of the Venetian concept of diplomacy came during the Renaissance. At this point in history, the Italian peninsula was fragmented into territories controlled by various city-states. Each had its own manifestation of government and power, whether a powerful family such as the Medici in Florence or the spiritual and temporal authority the Pope wielded in the Papal States. Venice was neither, but organized as a republic. Because of the way the government was set up, with rotating positions in the government and the checks and balances employed by the nobility upon their rule, it was able to sustain itself. Venice seemed to have acquired a monopoly of that rarest of Renaissance commodities, political stability.” With the problems of power from within relatively calm, the enemies from without were dealt with in a much more organized fashion. Venetians had a sense of civil service, and, “because it did so, Venice developed the first systemized diplomatic service known to history, a network of agents who pursued the interests of the republic with fidelity, with a realistic appraisal of risks, with freedom from sentimentality and illusion.” If the Republic did not have such a stable government, the Venetian system of sending ambassadors would have probably been much more complicated, not to mention laden with career diplomats who could potentially get cozy in one post for too long.

The success of Venice’s ambassadors and the strength they brought to the state was not a phenomenon ignored by other powers. Their systematic diplomacy “…was passed on to the states of central Italy…vulnerable to external threats and consequently [they] put an even greater premium than the Venetians upon accurate information and negotiation.” Venice taught other states that diplomacy meant the ability to better size up your opponents, as well as your allies, and subsequently meant smarter decisions about war and trade. The peninsula itself was an ideal place for the use of diplomacy to spread, for as Phillip Bobbitt explains, “[it] was a perfect laboratory for such a new society: the principal political actors spoke a common language; they were physically proximate; none was so powerful as to make diplomacy irrelevant….” The Venetian model brought much prosperity to the Republic, often in an indirect manner, and through the replication undertaken by other governments, the system was able to grow and spread, much to the benefit and prestige of the Venetians themselves as anyone else employing ambassadors.

Venice used it to foster peace among her surrounding Italian city-states. After the Peace of Lodi in 1454, Venice, Florence, and Milan signed the Treaty of Venice. These northern Italian city-states were each very powerful, and the diplomatic maneuverings achieved in this document created “…a collective security organization designed to make the status quo of relatively diffused power and equality among the major political units a permanent condition of the system” and it served as “the ground rules for conducting inter-state relations during the remainder of the century.” Both Florence and Milan created permanent missions to foreign states that were comparable to the Venetian diplomatic machine, although not nearly as strong. Because each of these states had effective ambassadors and negotiators, they were able to use this Venetian conception to create mutual assurances of peace between the city-states.

Sir Robert Peel the Younger once defined diplomacy in general as “the great engine used by civilized society for the purpose of maintaining peace.” The men that governed the Republic of Venice, and ran the diplomatic core it had seen grow over the centuries as an essential political entity, knew the value of its representatives.
They not only assured the peace, as Peel has stated as their main function, but also provided the way to gage the competitiveness of the surrounding societies in both the political and economic domains. The Republic of Venice was driven by its economic goals and ventures, and needed the information collected by its civil servants abroad to make better business decisions. The model was so successful that other Renaissance powers soon began to pay homage to the idea by copying it, and is still a vital tool that nations wield in international relations on a day-to-day basis.

Read more...